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Summary 
 
This article explores the contrasting diplomacies of the United States and the European 
Union, drawing attention to the characteristics of the US as a ‘warrior state’ and the EU as a 
form of ‘trading state’ in which a complex and hybrid form of diplomacy is produced through 
the interplay of European and national foreign policies. It then pursues the argument that the 
interplay of US and EU diplomacies has generated an evolving EU-US diplomatic system, 
which in itself is hybrid and multi-dimensional. The article explores the context within which 
the EU-US diplomatic system has evolved and is evolving, and proposes three key patterns of 
diplomatic relations as the core of the system: ‘special relationships’ reflecting specific ties 
between the US and key EU Member States, ‘transatlantic governance’ reflecting the growth 
of transatlantic transactions and demands for their management, and ‘world order diplomacy’ 
centred on global governance institutions, patterns of intervention and crisis management. 
The article explores these patterns as they have manifested themselves during the George W 
Bush and Obama Presidencies, and concludes by asking whether the implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty in the EU is likely to bring about significant change in the patterns of EU-US 
diplomacy. 
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Introduction 
This article aims to explore the ramifications of two coexisting processes, 
which arguably reflect ‘two worlds of diplomacy’ represented by the European 
Union (EU) and the United States (US). On the one hand, it examines the 
challenges posed by US foreign policy and diplomacy, and tries to identify 
some of the constants around which successive US Administrations have 
fluctuated. In doing so, it makes the argument that US diplomacy is pervaded 
by the character of the US as a ‘warrior state’, which places a strong 
emphasis on sovereignty, state action and the use of force.  
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 In contrast, European diplomacy represents a distinctive hybrid. On the 
one hand, there is European diplomacy in its broad sense, encompassing the 
diplomacy of European countries, among them some significant if secondary 
‘powers’, as well as patterns of collective European action. On the other hand, 
there is the diplomacy accompanying ‘European foreign policy’, centred on 
the European Union and reflecting the progress and limitation of the European 
integration project. The argument here is that both of these versions of 
‘European diplomacy’ need to be taken into account, and that the hybrid 
characteristics of ‘European diplomacy’ are precisely the result of the 
interaction between these two strands of development. 
 The article argues that these coexisting and intersecting 
characteristics of US and European diplomacy have given rise to a hybrid 
‘EU-US diplomatic system’ with a number of key characteristics and patterns 
of behaviour. This system is explored in more depth in terms of its impact 
during the George W Bush and Obama Presidencies, and in terms of 
developments in the EU after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
The article concludes by discussing the possibility that a new EU diplomatic 
system might transform the EU-US diplomatic system, and by linking the 
development of the EU-US system to broader developments in the field of 
diplomacy. 
 
The United States and Europe: Two Worlds of Diplomacy?  
A summary version of US diplomacy would certainly start from the central 
importance of strategy, and of ‘grand strategy’ in particular. US foreign policy 
discourse is characterised by attention to the building of a strategic framework 
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in which vital interests are identified and strategic choices made in order to 
facilitate the pursuit of those interests. There is a long tradition in debates 
about US foreign policy of reference to the demands of grand strategy, and of 
the key significance surrounding the procurement of capabilities – especially 
military capabilities - with which to pursue it1. Not surprisingly, these debates 
lead to a focus on material capabilities and what has been termed ‘hard 
power’ in the pursuit of US foreign policy ambitions; indeed, it has also been 
argued by Joseph Nye and others that the focus on ‘hard power’ has led to a 
squandering of US ‘soft power’ resources, and that the need to restore 
balance in US policy demands a focus on ‘smart power’2. Ultimately, this 
focus on grand strategy and ‘hard power’ means that there is an 
accompanying focus on the possibility (or indeed, the likelihood) of the use of 
force itself. 
 This focus on grand strategy, hard power and the likelihood of the use 
of force gives a very specific context for the development of US diplomacy. I 
would argue that this context has been apparent since the late 19th century, 
and that it has given the US the general characteristics of a ‘warrior state’3. 
The diplomacy of such a state is likely to be ‘sovereignist’, emphasising the 
autonomy of the state and the need to protect its national security, if 
necessary by the use of force. Where such a state musters dominant power 
                                            
1 See for example C Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the 
Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Vintage, 2002); R. Lieber, The American 
Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
2 J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in Foreign Policy (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004); R. Armitage and J. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power (Washington, DC: CSIS, 
2007); T. Galen Carpenter, Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America 
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008) 
3 M. Smith, ‘Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World 
Order’,International Politics vol 41, no. 1, 2004, pp. 96-117; M. Smith, ‘The European Union, 
the United States and Global Public Goods: Competing Models or Two Sides of the Same 
Coin?’ in R. Whitman (ed) Normative Power Europe: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives 
(London: Routledge). 
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within the world arena, its diplomacy is also likely to rest upon assumptions of 
precedence and of the capacity to challenge the sovereignty of other, lesser 
powers. Diplomacy in such a context is also likely to be directed towards (or 
result in) the cultivation of client relationships and of dependencies, whether 
formal or informal. Given the presence of dominant power, it is also probable 
that diplomacy will be strongly results-orientated, with a focus on bargaining 
against a background of superior resources – although such a diplomacy 
does not guarantee the desired results, given the capacity of lesser powers to 
exploit specific contexts or to act collectively against the dominant power4. 
The presence of dominant power also implies that the calculus of diplomacy is 
likely to be affected; in other words, whether or not – or how much - to use 
diplomatic methods becomes a matter of political choice, rather than a 
necessity reflecting the need to negotiate even with one’s sworn enemies. 
Such a pattern of diplomacy (broadly defined) has consequences for the 
pattern of diplomatic activity (narrowly defined): it is likely to circumscribe the 
influence of professional diplomats, to call into question the precedence of 
conventional diplomatic structures, and to engender at the very least 
suspicion and perhaps open resistance on the part of diplomatic partners. 
 No matter what the fluctuations in style and specific content, it might be 
argued, US foreign policy and diplomacy is consistently that of a ‘warrior 
state’. It does not matter which President or Administration is at issue – the 
features will be there, modified by circumstances or by issues but never 
absent. Thus, diplomacy will be strongly conditioned by the evolution of the 
global balance of power (as understood in Washington), and will also respond 
                                            
4 M. Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 
21st Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). 
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to domestic pressures, but will always manifest itself in the ways characteristic 
of a ‘warrior state’: sovereignist, shaped by grand strategy, admitting the 
possibility if not the probability of the use of force and centring on bargaining 
conditioned by the presence of dominant material power. Such a set of 
features is a stark contrast to – and a challenge to – more conventional 
approaches to US diplomatic practice. It challenges the role of the 
Department of State, it can lead to a centralisation of activity in the executive 
branch, and it tends to give a central role to the threat or the use of military 
force. It also constitutes a major challenge to European diplomacy. 
From the hybrid nature of European diplomacy outlined earlier arises 
one of its key characteristics: complexity of preferences and strategies. 
Whereas in the US case it is possible to debate ‘grand strategy’, in the 
European case such a debate is difficult to initiate, let alone to pursue on a 
consistent basis. Whilst Sven Biscop and others have made valiant attempts 
to argue the need for a ‘European grand strategy’5, it is very difficult to ignore 
the key obstacles to such a strategy. ‘Europe’ lacks a collective vision of the 
world – perhaps even of Europe itself – and lacks also the material resources 
and commitments from its constituent countries that would provide a basis for 
‘grand strategy’. The most significant EU statement of strategy, the European 
Security Strategy of 2003, revised in 2008, simply cannot refer to the solid 
                                            
5 S. Biscop, J. Howorth and B. Giegerich, Europe: A Time for Strategy (Egmont Paper 27, 
Brussels: Academia Press for the Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009); S. Biscop 
(ed), The Value of Power, the Power of Values (Egmont Paper 33, Brussels: Academia Press 
for the Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009); A. de Vasconcelos (ed), A Strategy 
for EU Foreign Policy (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010); J. 
Howorth, ‘The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 48, no. 3, 2010, pp. 455-74. 
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core of material assets that would underpin any pursuit of concrete goals6 
(Council 2003, 2008; Dannreuther and Peterson, 2006). Whereas the United 
States can be criticised for squandering its ‘soft power’, the EU in areas 
outside commercial and development policy has  to base its pursuit of world 
order predominantly on the politics of persuasion and attraction. Whereas the 
United States can be criticised for placing material interests above common 
values in its pursuit of grand strategy, the EU can equally be faulted for having 
nothing but broad statements of ‘European values’ with which to focus its 
international activity. To be sure, its Member States have the interests, and 
some have the resources, on which to base a conventional international 
strategy, but to say this is of course to highlight the problem – the EU   cannot 
reliably and consistently extract resources from or supplant the interests of its 
Member States. The implications for diplomatic practices at the European 
level are important: the lack of state authority, of ‘hard power’ and of a military 
establishment has meant that representation, communication and negotiation 
have been carried out on the one hand in something of a political and 
strategic vacuum, whilst on the other hand ‘European’ diplomats have had 
constantly to allow for the presence and often the competing activities of 
member state diplomatic structures. 
 There is of course a way of expressing this complexity and patchiness. 
Whereas the US can be presented as a ‘warrior state’, espousing a 
sovereignist foreign policy and diplomacy, prone to the use of hard power and 
inclined to pursue bilateral or even unilateral courses of action, the EU might 
be characterised as a ‘trading state’. Such a characterisation implies a 
                                            
6 A Secure Europe in a Better World, Council of the EU December 2003, 2008; R. 
Dannreuther and J. Peterson (eds), Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Biscop et al, A Time For Strategy. 
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diplomacy centred on implementation of a post-sovereign ‘civilian’ or 
‘normative’ foreign policy, largely but not entirely expressed through the use of 
‘soft power’ and channelled through multilateral negotiations or institutional 
engagement wherever possible7. No matter that at least occasionally the EU 
seems to act at least a bit like a more conventional ‘power’, and that its use of 
‘soft power’ can appear distinctly ‘hard edged’ to those who experience it – 
the central tendencies are clear, and clearly distinguished from those of US 
foreign policy and diplomatic practices. 
 A series of paradoxes results from this, underlining the hybridity of 
‘European diplomacy’. In present conditions, the EU seems fated to pursue a 
kind of rootless diplomacy, without the basis in concrete interests or material 
resources that might give it a harder core. As noted above, such a diplomacy 
is often characterised as ‘post-sovereign’8, but it exists in a global (and a 
European) arena where there is still plenty of ‘sovereignist’ diplomacy’ to be 
found. Partly as a result of this uneasy coexistence, European diplomacy can 
be seen as ‘process orientated’ rather than ‘results-orientated’, since it is 
through the process of (preferably multilateral) engagement and negotiation 
that some degree of self-realisation of a collective European diplomatic entity 
can be observed. There is often a veneer of collective action, and of common 
strategy, but this veneer can be shattered all too easily when confronted with 
challenges from more conventional ‘powers’. There is a degree of 
‘Brusselisation’ of diplomacy, which has been underlined by the provisions of 
                                            
7 Smith, ‘Between Two Worlds’ and ‘The EU, the US and Global Public Goods’. The idea of 
the ‘trading state’ was first discussed by Richard Rosecrance: R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the 
Trading State: Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); see also R. 
Rosecrance, ‘Trading States in  New Concert of Europe‘ in H. Haftendorn and C. Tuschhoff 
(eds) America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 
8 R. Adler-Nissen, ‘Late Sovereign Diplomacy’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 
2009, pp. 121-41. 
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the Lisbon Treaty for a common diplomatic service (the European External 
Action Service) and by the development of stronger institutions for the 
coordination of foreign policy in general and of diplomatic activity in 
particular9. But the system of ‘European diplomacy’ remains a focus for 
important internal tensions, engaging a multitude of stakeholders at both 
national and European levels10. 
 
A European-American Diplomatic System? 
The US is the most significant ‘other’ of the European integration process, but 
at the same time, it is also part of a collective ‘we’ expressed in the broader 
structures and processes of transatlantic relations and in terms of the 
increasing economic integration of the North Atlantic area11. If there is an 
emergent European-American diplomatic system centred on EU-US relations,  
such a system will express the differences of diplomatic cultures and practices 
outlined in the earlier parts of the article, as well as the hybridity and 
complexity of the emerging EU diplomatic system itself. As a result, in 
contrast to the stark dichotomy suggested earlier between the diplomacy of 
the US as a ‘warrior state’ and the EU as a ‘trading state’, the EU-US 
diplomatic system is itself likely to be a hybrid and a challenge to assumptions 
of difference on both sides of the Atlantic. 
                                            
9 D. Allen, ‘Who Speaks for Europe?’ in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign 
Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge, 1998). See also for 
the EEAS, S. Duke, ‘Providing for European-level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the 
European External Action Service’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 
211-33. 
10 B. Hocking and M. Smith, ‘The Emerging Diplomatic System of the European Union: 
Frameworks and Issues’, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 
Standing Group on the European Union Conference, Porto, Portugal, June 2010. A revised 
version of the same paper was presented at the University Association for Contemporary 
European Studies 40th Annual Conference, Bruges, Belgium, September 2010. 
11 S. McGuire and M. Smith, The European Union and the United States: Competition and 
Convergence in the Global Arena (London: Routledge, 2008), chapter 2. 
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 I would argue that the European-American diplomatic system 
demonstrates three key sets of diplomatic processes, which are and will 
remain central to its development. These can be summarised as ‘special 
relationships’, ‘transatlantic governance’ and ‘world order diplomacy’. The first 
of these, ‘special relationships’, reflects the conventional end of the diplomatic 
spectrum. It privileges relationships between the US and individual countries 
in Europe, including, of course, all members of the EU; and by doing so, it 
reflects the rather traditional tendencies of dominant powers to foster client 
relations and dependencies, and lesser powers to cluster around the 
dominant. The expressions of this type of relationship are diverse in form, but 
not necessarily in essence; they range in recent years from the ritual ‘race to 
the White House’ of European leaders at the beginning of each new US 
Administration to the ‘shoulder to shoulder’ diplomacy of the early War on 
Terror and the invasion of Iraq. They are the opposite, apparently, of any 
notion of European collective diplomacy, and they demonstrate the capacity of 
the US to divide and rule almost without trying. But they are not unaffected by 
the development of ‘European diplomacy’ centred on the EU. Even the most 
significant of the EU Member States are not immune to the shaping of their 
diplomacy by their involvement in the ‘multi-perspectival polity’ created by 
European integration, whilst the ‘Europeanisation’ of the diplomatic practices 
of lesser EU Member States can make a significant difference to their 
approach to the dominant power, for example by expanding the scope of their 
diplomatic involvement in general and by providing political economies of 
scale to cover their disagreements with US policies12 . 
                                            
12 Spence, D.  ‘Taking Stock: Fifty Years of European Diplomacy’ The Hague Journal of 
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 Another central element in the emerging European-American 
diplomatic system is that of ‘transatlantic governance’. Especially in the area 
of transatlantic political economy and economic diplomacy, there has grown 
up a forest of institutions dedicated to managing transactions and the 
inevitable disputes between the EU and the US13. Many of these institutions 
fall broadly within the ambit of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, first 
established in the late 1990s but given new form and direction after a German 
initiative in 2007. They are built upon the foundations provided during the 
1990s by the Transatlantic Declaration and then the New Transatlantic 
Agenda14. And they have spread into broader areas of regulatory cooperation 
such as those involved with anti-trust and competition policy, or air transport 
policy, often as the result of extended EU-US commercial diplomacy15. They 
have been joined since 9.11 by a range of institutions and practices dedicated 
to counter-terrorism, and involving areas such as regulation of financial 
transactions, exchange of passenger information and broader police 
cooperation16. Often, of course, these processes of governance are carried 
out by persons who would not be instantly recognised as diplomats, and 
whose practices are not those of conventional diplomacy, embodying as they 
do elements of legal and technical expertise that are not commonly found in 
                                                                                                                             
Diplomacy vol. 4, no.2, 2009, pp. 235-59. 
13 M. Pollack and G. Shaffer (eds), Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001; J. Peterson and M. Pollack (eds), Europe, 
America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 
2003); B. Steffenson, Managing EU-US Relations: Actors, Institutions and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 
14 M. Pollack, ‘The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in 
International Governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 43, no. 5, 2005, pp. 899-
919 
15 See for example C. Damro, Cooperating on Competition in Transatlantic Economic 
Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006). 
16 See W. Rees, Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative (London: 
Routledge); W. Rees, ‘The External Politics of Internal Security’ in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) 
International Relations and the European Union (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
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foreign offices. The processes are thus sustained by networks of cooperation 
in which diplomats may be joined by ‘domestic’ officials and by non-
governmental actors, producing a form of ‘intense transgovernmentalism’ with 
added transnational elements at the transatlantic level. Their growth provides 
compelling evidence of the ways in which a hybrid diplomatic system already 
exists between the EU and the US – and it also plays to the strengths of the 
EU by focusing on political economy and regulatory politics rather than the 
‘high politics’ of conventional security policies. 
 The third element of the EU-US diplomatic system that should be 
explored here is ‘world order diplomacy’. This is an area in which ‘European 
diplomacy’ has received decidedly mixed notices, especially in its attempts to 
exercise diplomatic influence outside its own European backyard; critics have 
drawn attention to the slowness and deliberative nature of EU foreign policy-
making, and to the ways in which European leverage declines dramatically 
once it moves outside areas in which it might be seen as exercising ‘external 
governance’.  This has also been noted by a series of US policy-makers, 
including those of both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations, 
and as a result it could be argued that the EU has become progressively 
marginalized in US diplomacy during the post-Cold War period – even, it must 
be said, in some regions very close to the EU heartland, in the Balkans and 
the Caucasus. 
A related area of tension and ambiguity in the EU-US diplomatic 
system, when it comes to matters of world order, centres on the availability 
and potential use of force. There has developed a strong differentiation 
between EU policies largely based on conflict prevention (and thus on the 
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predominance of diplomacy and ‘civilian’ methods) and US policies that 
contemplate the use of force ab initio (even if force is not actually deployed). 
But there is also an element of differentiation within the EU itself, where a 
number of Member States are more ready and able to contemplate the use of 
force, and where this readiness is accentuated by the demands of US 
diplomacy. This opens up the prospect of ‘divide and rule’ in EU-US 
diplomacy, either as the result of deliberate US tactics or as a reflection of 
internal tensions within the EU itself. 
 Such negative judgements do not, however, reflect the whole picture. 
The EU-US diplomatic system in relation to world order issues is not simply a 
case study in US dominance and European deference or marginalisation. 
Partly, this reflects the changing nature of ‘world order issues’ themselves, 
with the growing emphasis on global governance and institutions that has 
been noted by many analysts17. The EU has seemed at times to have a 
comparative advantage in the kinds of multilateral diplomacy that are required 
in areas such as the regulation of the global environment, the pursuit of 
international human rights and the governance of global development, arising 
not least out of its experience with complex issues of international governance 
within the Union itself. This might be compared favourably with the discomfort 
felt by US diplomats in situations where they are not (or no longer) the 
‘governors’ and are faced with issues of adaptation and adjustment with which 
                                            
17 See for example: J. Nye and J. Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globalizing World 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000); M. Kahler and A. Lake (eds), Governance in a 
Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003); A. Prakash and J, Hart (eds), Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 
1999); A. Prakash and J, Hart (eds), Responding to Globalization (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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they are not familiar, such as the new politics of trade and the environment18. 
The EU has also, with the development of its capacity for crisis management, 
stabilisation and reconstruction, discovered a capacity for intervention which 
seems to express a type of ‘structural diplomacy’ aimed at getting below the 
skin of actors in regional and other conflicts19. In such interventions, the US 
has often been absent, partly because they have occurred predominantly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where US diplomacy has until recently been dormant; 
where the US has been heavily engaged, as in the Middle East, the EU has 
found it very difficult to develop either a collective position or an effective 
structural diplomacy20.  
As a result of these co-existing areas of ambiguity and tension, the EU-
US diplomatic system displays a number of key features. Bilateral ‘special 
relationships’ flourish alongside a growing system of transatlantic governance 
in which governmental and non-governmental actors interact in conditions of 
complex interdependence, and both are accompanied by a diplomacy of world 
order in which the EU is increasingly active but is frequently marginalized by 
considerations of US grand strategy – or marginalizes itself through actual or 
potential defections by Member States. Often, defection is a reflection of 
precisely those ‘special relationships’ that exist elsewhere in the EU-US 
                                            
18 M. Smith, ‘The EU, the US and International Organizations: Trade Politics in the Global 
Political Economy’, in S. Blavoukos and D. Bourantonis (eds), The EU Presence in 
International Organizations (London: Routledge, 2010); M. Smith, ‘The EU, the US and Global 
Governance’, in U. Wunderlich and D. Bailey (eds), The European Union and Global 
Governance: A Handbook (London: Routledge, 2010). 
19 S. Keukeleire, ‘The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and 
Structural Diplomacy’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003, pp. 31-56; S. Keukeleire 
and J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2008); S. Keukeleire, R. Thiers and A. Justaert, ‘Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural 
Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 
2, 2009, pp. 211-33. 
20 R. Youngs, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11 (Boulder, CO and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 
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diplomatic system; it is noticeably more prevalent in areas of global security 
and ‘high politics’ than in areas of transatlantic and global governance. The 
system is thus hybrid, evolving and fluctuating, and reflects short-term 
changes in political preferences and practices as well as longer-term 
underlying contrasts between European and US diplomacy. 
 
Euro-American Diplomacy from Bush to Obama 
How have the challenges created by the contrasting natures of European and 
US diplomacy played out in recent policy developments, and how has the 
hybrid nature of the EU-US diplomatic system shaped diplomatic processes 
and outcomes? In this part of the article, I argue that the first decade of the 
twenty-first century displays distinct phases of EU-US diplomacy – centring on 
successive US Administrations and their foreign policies, but shaped in part 
by developments within the EU itself – and that each of these phases can be 
accounted for in terms of the three types of diplomatic focuses identified 
above: ‘special relationships’, transatlantic governance and world order. As a 
result, I argue, each US Administration has posed a specific challenge to 
European diplomacy and the EU has produced a specific pattern of response. 
 In terms of the three coexisting strands of EU-US diplomacy outlined 
earlier in this article, there are important implications to be drawn from the first 
George W. Bush Administration and its impact on European diplomacy. First, 
the assertiveness and the peremptory nature of US policy gave renewed 
salience to ‘special relationships’. Some of these were of long standing, the 
most obvious being that between Britain and the United States; others were 
relatively new, for example the relationship between Poland and the United 
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States. The impact of the British-American ‘special relationship’  was clear in 
the diplomacy of armed conflict, not just in Iraq but also in Afghanistan, but it 
also made its mark in the new diplomacy of the ‘War on Terror’, with its 
emphasis on the exchange of intelligence and the use of new instruments to 
contain terrorist operations and their resources. The impact of the ‘special 
relationships’ between the US and the new EU member states  was perhaps 
more unexpected, since Poland and a number of other new Member States 
(who did not, let us remember, enter the EU until January 2004) had a far less 
substantial track record of dissent from collective EU positions; this in part 
accounts for French President Chirac’s conclusion in 2003 that the new 
Member States had missed a good opportunity to keep quiet, and his 
resentment of Rumsfeld’s ‘old/new Europe’ pronouncements. 
 Alongside the inevitable dramas attached to the emergence or re-
emergence of ‘special relationships’, it is important to note that the diplomacy 
of transatlantic governance continued. There were significant new dimensions 
to this area of diplomacy – some of them arising from the ‘War on Terror’, 
such as those relating to financial controls or the exchange of passenger 
information21 – but there were also long-established processes of cooperation 
in trade and related areas, now including work for example on competition 
policy22. Even though the influence of unilateralism and assertive or even 
coercive diplomacy was felt in areas such as environmental policy or 
development policy, these were areas in which the diplomacy of EU-US 
                                            
21 Rees, Transatlantic Security Cooperation; Rees, ‘The External Politics of Internal Security’. 
22 Damro, Cooperating on Competition Policy. 
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relations was on a far more even keel than in the areas of ‘high politics’ and 
‘hard security’23. 
 As might be expected from the account of ‘special relationships’ above, 
the EU-US diplomacy of world order presented a picture of conflict and 
tensions during the first George W. Bush Administration. Most obviously, this 
was felt in relation to the Iraq war and the ‘War on Terror’. But there was a 
crucial difference between the ways in which EU and US diplomacy interacted 
in the two domains. On Iraq, the Americans could pose a challenge that the 
Europeans collectively were simply unable to meet, by acting unilaterally, 
emphasising pre-emption rather than prevention, and calling in the ‘special 
relationships’ that were most potent among a number of EU Member States. 
In the ‘War on Terror’, on the other hand, the instruments of conflict were 
more diverse and less the subject of an effective US monopoly; dealing with 
terrorism required financial, administrative and other instruments that the 
Europeans were able to mobilise collectively, and on which EU-US agreement 
was far more efficient than a series of bilateral diplomatic processes. Even in 
the area of ‘high politics’ therefore, the European collectively had something 
to offer.  
At the same time, the Europeans were able to muster collective will in a 
number of areas of global governance and thus to resist or to by-pass US 
opposition. Two examples must suffice: the first is the diplomacy of the 
International Criminal Court, where the EU on the whole stood firmly behind 
ratification of the Rome Statute even while the Americans were trying to 
encourage defections and bilateral agreements, and the second is the 
                                            
23 Peterson and Pollack, Europe, America, Bush. 
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ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases, where the US firmly 
rejected the prospect and yet the EU was able to secure the entry into force of 
the Protocol in the final analysis by persuading the Russians to ratify. In both 
of these cases, the Europeans showed an unexpected capacity to define a 
collective decision, to defend it against American pressures and to deploy 
diplomatic resources in order to achieve their objectives through processes of 
communication and negotiation on the ground. 
 The conclusions from the period of the first George W. Bush 
Administration, insofar as it affected EU-US diplomacy, are inevitably mixed. It 
is clear that the assertive, not to say confrontational nature, of US diplomacy 
presented a direct – if not always intentional - challenge to attempts to foster 
European solidarity and collective action. It is also clear that one response to 
the pressure was for EU Member States to develop their own diplomatic lines 
in relation to Washington, either in alignment with or in distinction to US 
diplomacy, and that this, as was to be expected, underlined the persistent 
strength of Member State interests in the hybrid EU diplomatic system. But it 
is equally clear that in areas outside the ‘high politics’ of armed conflict, EU 
solidarity was a continuing theme, and that in a number of areas the 
Europeans proved equal to the kinds of pressures applied by the United 
States. Indeed, in some of these areas, the very assertiveness and 
unilateralism of US diplomacy made it easier to achieve EU solidarity and to 
persist with a collective European diplomatic stance. At the same time, the 
diplomacy of transatlantic governance provided a consistent (if not 
untroubled) underpinning for the management of complex interdependence in 
the political economy of EU-US relations, and that interdependence continued 
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to grow, in terms both of mutual investment and of the exchange of goods and 
services in the transatlantic economy 
 It was perhaps inevitable in this context that ‘Bush II’, the second 
George W. Bush Administration (2005-2009) would see something of a 
reaction against the extremes experienced in 2002-2004. Within the US itself, 
more conventional diplomacy made a come-back, not least through the close 
alignment of the State Department under Condoleezza Rice with the 
President himself, and increasing attention to what was termed 
‘transformational diplomacy’ in relation to developing countries and areas of 
instability24. was also a greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to the 
handling of conflicts and the management of disputes – partly reflecting the 
fact that American policy had reached the limits of its resources with 
involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the use of force in Iraq 
especially was increasingly questioned in the United States itself. Thus, in 
dealing with Iran’s potential nuclear capacity, the approach was very different 
from that pursued in Iraq. Significantly, it involved the use of collective 
diplomacy based within the EU, operating through the ‘EU-3’ (Britain, France 
and Germany) and in turn linked to action within the United Nations to 
strengthen sanctions against Iran25. At the same time, the Administration 
made efforts to rebuild bridges with the EU collectively, most notably through 
the President’s visit to the EU institutions in Brussels – including the first by a 
                                            
24 J. Vaisse, Transformational Diplomacy (Chaillot Paper 103, Paris: European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, 2007). It must be noted, however, that the switch to ‘transformational 
diplomacy’ did not always extend much beyond the President and the Secretary of State, and 
that considerable doubts about its effectiveness were expressed in the State Department. 
See A. Holmes, ‘Where are the Civilians? How to Rebuild the U.S. Foreign Service‘, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 89, no. 1, Jan/Feb. 2009, pp. 148-60. 
25 See W. Posch (ed) Iranian Challenges (Chaillot Paper 89, Paris: EU Institute for security 
Studies, 2006); C. Bertram, Re-Thinking Iran: from Confrontation to Cooperation (Chaillot 
Paper 110, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2008). 
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serving President to the European Commission. There were increasing 
diplomatic efforts to engage the Europeans in post-conflict reconstruction in a 
number of areas, and to develop a division of labour in dealing with key 
aspects of the ‘War on Terror’. Not surprisingly, the results of this re-
orientation were to be seen in a re-ordering of the key strands in EU-US 
diplomatic relations. By the end of ‘Bush II’, special relationships were less in 
evidence, transatlantic governance had demonstrated its continuing vitality, 
and world order diplomacy was conducted with more of an eye to what the 
Europeans might be able to contribute26. 
 This partial diplomatic rebuilding of the EU-US system had a 
paradoxical effect on EU diplomacy. It became easier to collaborate at the EU 
level with the Americans, and (as noted above) to work out areas in which a 
division of labour might be helpful; but at the same time, the ‘cement’ that had 
been provided by opposition to US policies (and which could act as a counter 
to the divisiveness embodied in ‘special relationships’) became less easy to 
discern. Overall, issues became easier and more susceptible to diplomatic 
treatment, but at the same time the grand questions of the early 2000s faded 
away. In a way, and certainly from 2007 onwards, the Europeans were waiting 
for Bush’s successor. Simultaneously, at the European level, they were 
waiting for an outcome to the convoluted process that produced first the 
Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty. As a result of these two 
trends, one in the US and the other in the EU, by 2008 anticipation was high 
that on the one hand there would be a new President who would privilege 
diplomacy, and on the other hand there would be a European Union equipped 
                                            
26 De Vasconcelos and Zaborowski, Friends Again? 
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to respond diplomatically to new opportunities. ‘Waiting for Obama’ and 
‘waiting for Lisbon’ were a European preoccupation during the later part of 
2008 and the early part of 2009. 
Barack Obama was thus the presidential candidate favoured by the 
overwhelming majority of European populations and by the preponderance of 
the European political and diplomatic elites. On the one hand, he was the ‘un-
Bush’ – an antidote to the unilateralism and the confrontational diplomacy of 
the early 2000s, and to the uncertain drift towards partial multilateralism 
during the President’s second term. On the other hand, and more positively, 
the Obama campaign promised a renewed commitment to multilateralism and 
by implication to a constructive relationship with the EU and its Member 
States. In fact, the diplomatic challenge of the Obama Presidency turned out 
to be as great as that posed by the Bush Presidencies, albeit in very different 
ways. 
 The reasons for this renewed challenge were four. First, although the 
new Administration set about building a foreign policy that gave far more 
prominence to international organisations generally and to multilateralism in 
many forms, it explicitly demanded that partners in this process should step 
up to the plate and accept responsibility, rather than simply letting the US take 
the strain. Second, and related, the Administration based its policies on a form 
of pragmatic realism that was designed to be adaptable to the specific 
challenges and opportunities confronting the US; as a result, the key driving 
factor was interests and opportunities as they presented themselves to 
Washington rather than long term or programmatic commitments to specific 
partners. Third – and again related – the changing structure of the world 
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arena had by 2009 created new challenges to which the US would have to 
respond; partly these challenges were economic, but partly also they were 
related to a changing appreciation of the global power structure that had 
inescapable political and security dimensions. Fourth, the impact of the 2008-
2009 financial crisis inevitably meant that much of the President’s attention 
would be focused on the domestic arena, and that many external questions 
would be viewed through the prism of domestic politics – perhaps even more 
so than has been traditionally the case in US foreign policy27. 
For the Europeans, granted the President they had (almost) all wanted, 
this was a challenging set of conditions within which to construct a diplomatic 
partnership. Four questions for the Europeans followed from the four aspects 
of US diplomacy outlined above. First, were the Europeans ready? In other 
words, would the EU be able to step up to the plate on key diplomatic issues 
and to match the US desire for new forms of multilateralism and global 
governance? The European answer to this question was bound to be 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Obama was not Bush (or at least, not ‘Bush I’): 
but as noted above, that actually made him more difficult for many Europeans 
to deal with, since a knee-jerk anti-Americanism was no longer an appropriate 
response to demands from Washington. From the US point of view, the 
confusion of points of view surrounding the Lisbon Treaty as a whole, and 
then the ways in which the foreign policy components of the Treaty might take 
effect, provided evidence of something they had seen before – the Europeans 
engaging in intense introspection with a sign on the door saying ‘do not 
                                            
27 See for example: A de Vasconcelos and M. Zaborowski (eds), The Obama Moment: 
European and American Perspectives (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009); Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies, The European Union, the United States and Global 
Governance.  
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disturb’, and proving incapable of responding to key demands and 
expectations28. Once the treaty was ratified and entered into force, in late 
2009, a new phase of introspection began, this time centred on the ways in 
which the External Action Service, the High Representative for Foreign Policy 
and the President of the European Council might be established and then how 
they might interact in the conduct of European diplomacy. The appointment of 
apparently low-key administrators to the posts of High Representative and 
President of the European Council only served to underline this suspicion. In 
this context, it seemed somehow logical that the Obama Administration opted 
out of an EU-US summit in 2010, on the grounds that there would be nothing 
significant on the agenda29. 
The second question for the Europeans was, could they make 
themselves significant, or would they be marginalized? At the beginning of 
2009, the usual rush of European leaders to Washington to meet the new 
President included the President of the Commission, as well as the (Spanish) 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and there was a mini-rush of proposals 
for new EU-US agreements to solidify and extend the transatlantic 
partnership. None of these came to anything very much, and attention for the 
US Administration was inexorably drawn away to areas where there were 
immediate challenges and an immediate call for resources, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan. These were areas in which collective EU diplomacy had very 
little to offer, either because of a long-standing opposition to intervention (in 
the case of Iraq) by many Member States, or because of growing reluctance 
                                            
28 See for example, A. Gardner and S. Eizenstat, ‘New Treaty, New Influence? Europe’s 
Chance to Punch its Weight’, Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 2, 2009, pp.104-19. 
29 For a review of this disillusionment, see G. Rachman, ‘The death of the European dream’, 
Financial Times, 18th May 2010, p. 13. 
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to stay involved (in the case of Afghanistan) on the part of almost all Member 
States. In this context, the notion of a collective European diplomatic effort 
was almost a contradiction in terms, and could not be backed up by reliable 
access to the necessary resources. As a result, although EU involvement in 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan especially was significant, the key areas 
of diplomacy affected NATO (because of the issues surrounding the 
International Stabilisation and Assistance Force) and a number of EU Member 
States (because of their continuing involvement in the military effort). Where 
US pressure and US demands were felt was most obviously in NATO, not the 
EU. 
The third question staring the Europeans in the face was a reflection of 
the changing structure of the world arena. Given the emergence of new 
economic and political powers (and the partial re-emergence of others), could 
the EU establish itself as a ‘pole’ in the newly multipolar world, and retain the 
attention of the US? For the past fifteen years, the EU has worked towards a 
system of ‘strategic partnerships’ with countries such as China, India, Brazil 
and Russia – and of course, its first and most important ‘strategic partner’ is 
the US30. But it is open to question whether this intense diplomatic effort has 
actually put the EU in position to act as a key ‘pole’ in the new world power 
structure. The doubts surrounding this area were underlined by the early 
diplomacy of the Obama Administration, which seemed to lend substance to 
the idea of a ‘G-2’ – the US and China. For a series of economic and political 
                                            
30 For a review of the EU’s attempts at ‘strategic partnerships’, see G. Grevi and A. de 
Vasconcelos (eds), Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, 
India and Russia (Chaillot Paper 109, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2008). Philip 
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during 2010: see for example, ‘A neuralgic Europe trails petulantly in America’s wake’, 
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Obama’s grave’, Financial Times, 15th October 2010, p. 15. 
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reasons, Beijing was a far more salient and immediate concern of US 
diplomacy than Brussels, and this was signified by the fact that Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton’s first overseas visit was to Asia in general and to China 
in particular. The Administration’s proclaimed target of ‘re-setting’ relations 
with major powers, starting with Russia, and of addressing itself to other major 
regional powers, also gave the very strong impression that Washington saw 
Brussels as declining in the international pecking order (a fact that was of 
course linked to Europe’s inability to respond to earlier questions dealt with in 
this section)31. Perhaps the most striking statement of this new order of 
priorities was the diplomacy surrounding the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 
December 2009, where the EU, having entered the process thinking of itself 
as a climate leader, was progressively marginalized by a diplomacy which 
saw China flexing its muscles and the US in the shape of the President 
arriving at a late stage to steal the show32. 
The changing global power structure linked in turn with the final 
question that the EU had to answer: could Europe shape diplomatic solutions 
to the global financial crisis that would make it a credible partner for the US, 
and draw Washington away from its inevitable domestic preoccupations? In 
this area, of course, the EU does not have a single diplomatic presence; the 
coexistence of the European Central Bank with the central banks of those 
countries not members of the Euro, and the hydra-headed nature of EU 
external policies involving the Commission, the Member States and other EU 
institutions, is not a strong prima facie basis for dealing on equal terms with 
                                            
31 For a review of this strategic direction, see D. Dombey and G. Rachman, ‘Mapped Out; 
America and the World’, Financial Times, 3rd June 2009, p. 11. 
32 J. Vogler, ‘The Challenge of the Environment, Energy and Climate Change’, in C. Hill and 
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either Washington or the emerging powers in the world economy. During 2009 
and 2010, the difficulties of agreeing on appropriate measures to combat the 
crisis within the EU constituted a major impediment to a European ‘grand 
strategy’ for global economic reform, culminating in the disarray within the 
Euro zone over the financial and economic crisis in Greece. At the same time, 
the emergence of the G-20 as a mechanism for global economic coordination, 
and the relative retreat of the G-7/8, constituted at first glance a clear dilution 
of the EU’s influence in global economic diplomacy. Whether or not this 
proves to be the case in the long term, the EU’s status as a core global 
economic power and a key participant in international rule-making has come 
under scrutiny. Meanwhile, the US has continued to be preoccupied with its 
own internal economic crisis, and on the changing internal politics that go 
along with the mid-term elections and the misfortunes of the Obama 
Administration. 
In terms of the three dimensions of the EU-US diplomatic system that 
have been at the heart of the argument, some significant developments can 
be discerned from this study of the Obama Administration’s first two years. An 
immediately striking feature is that ‘special relationships’ have played a far 
less prominent role in the conduct of EU-US diplomacy since 2009 than they 
did under the Bush Administration. It could be argued that this retreat from 
‘special relationships’ was under way under the second George W. Bush 
Administration, but it certainly accelerated once Obama entered the White 
House. In part this reflects the less contentious nature of EU-US relations as a 
whole – but it also reflects the emergence of new preoccupations for US 
diplomacy, in the shape of the ‘BRICs’ and other emerging powers. A second 
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feature is that the diplomacy of transatlantic governance has remained low 
key and has led to the resolution (or at least the non-escalation) of a number 
of ongoing disputes, especially in the political economy of transatlantic 
relations. A final and very striking feature is that ‘world order’ diplomacy has 
seen the Europeans taking a back seat – unwillingly – as new powers have 
attracted the Americans’ attention and as these powers have played a more 
active role in issues of global governance33. At the same time, the EU has 
been unable to respond effectively to the more demanding US requests for 
assistance in ‘world order’ issues such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan – 
despite the fact that the voice asking for assistance is one that they wanted in 
the White House. 
There is an obvious conclusion to this phase of the argument: that 
during 2009 and 2010, the Obama Administration’s diplomacy, combined with 
a series of interrelated factors emerging from within and outside the EU, led to 
a relative marginalisation of European diplomacy both in relation to the US 
and in the broader world arena. The pragmatic realism and conditional 
multilateralism of the US Administration proved more demanding in some 
ways than the diplomacy of the George W. Bush years, dramatic as that 
sometimes was. Ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty proved 
time-consuming and led to a prolonged burst of introspection in the EU. The 
changing global power structure led to inevitable changes of focus and when 
combined with the global financial crisis these diluted the capacity of the EU 
to respond to US diplomacy, or to shape any of the positions coming out of 
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Washington. As a result, questions arise about the future of the EU-US 
diplomatic system and about the future of European diplomacy. 
 
Conclusions 
The United States is central to the development of European diplomacy – and 
it will remain so. American diplomacy is a key shaping force in the logics that 
drive the creation of a ‘European foreign policy’, and constitutes a key 
presence in determining the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of EU diplomacy 
as well as that of the Union’s Member States. Although there are strong 
elements of continuity in US foreign policy and diplomacy, each new 
Administration in Washington poses new challenges because of the ways in 
which successive Presidents and their foreign policy teams choose to 
approach and to deal with Europe. These forces in US diplomacy intersect 
and interact with those shaping the essentially hybrid nature of diplomacy 
within Europe and within the EU. As noted earlier in this article, the multiple 
influences on and modes of EU-US diplomacy are not reducible to a simple 
contrast between ‘warrior states’ and ‘trading states’, although those 
characterisations provide a powerful starting point for analysis. As a result of 
the intersection between US and European diplomacy, a hybrid and multi-
focal ‘EU-US diplomatic system’ has emerged, containing (at least) three 
distinct strands: the diplomacy of ‘special relationships’, of transatlantic 
governance and of world order.  
 The operational consequences of these coexisting modes of diplomacy 
are significant both for the US and for the Europeans. At one level, there is a 
permanent likelihood of ‘divide-and-rule’, with US diplomacy and ‘special 
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relationships’ driving wedges between the Europeans. At a second level, 
thanks to the pressures and constraints of complex interdependence 
embodied in the diplomacy of transatlantic governance, there is a great deal 
of continuity and mutual engagement. At a third level, the diplomacy of world 
order in the contemporary era demonstrates features of the kind of intense 
bilateralism that can be seen in ‘special relationships’, of the kind of intense 
transgovernmentalism and transnationalism that is also present in 
transatlantic governance, and of the diplomacy of ‘grand strategy’ that is 
embodied in approaches to the changing power structure of the global arena. 
Within this context, the EU-US diplomatic system varies in salience, in impact 
and in the constraints it imposes on the parties to it. Here again, the nature of 
‘domestic’ leaderships in the United States is a key shaping factor. 
 Another key factor, as I have noted at several junctures, is the nature 
of the European integration project, and more specifically the construction of a 
European Union diplomacy. This has been and remains an uncertain quantity, 
partly because of the uncertainties arising from the broader integration and 
‘European foreign policy’ projects of which it is part. One of the hopes pinned 
on the Lisbon Treaty by Europeans, and indeed by many outside Europe 
including those in Washington, was that it would mark a definitive act of 
creation in the emergence of a European diplomacy, both through the impact 
of institutional changes and through the recognition on the part of Europeans 
that such a diplomacy was a key element in the emergence of a European 
identity and a European collective presence in world politics. 
 Such a European diplomacy cannot yet be taken for granted. One 
reason for this lies in the inevitable internal wrangling over the constitution of 
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the European diplomatic machine, which has characterised the period since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Another reason for continued 
uncertainty about the future of European diplomacy lies in the challenges 
posed by international structure and the attitudes of significant others, the 
most important of which is the US. The evaluation of EU-US diplomacy 
carried out in this paper and covering the George W. Bush and early Obama 
years, indicates that US diplomacy will remain a challenge to European 
diplomacy in the long term, and that while different US administrations will 
pose their own specific and often dramatic challenges, the underlying 
challenge itself cannot be shirked. The EU-US diplomatic system will remain 
complex and hybrid in nature, generating continuing arguments about 
competition, convergence and divergence between European and US 
diplomacy, and demanding sophisticated and differentiated diplomatic 
responses from both sides of the Atlantic. No clearer illustration could be 
found of this set of demands than the impact of the ‘Arab spring’ and of the 
killing of Osama bin Laden in early 2011. Although these two episodes await 
detailed analysis and evaluation, it might be contended that they not only 
exposed the underlying differences of diplomatic and ‘hard power’ capacity 
between the EU and the US but also demonstrated in sharp form the multi-
focal nature of the ‘EU-US diplomatic system’ and the resulting tensions in the 
EU’s emerging diplomacy. 
  
